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Abstract:   Large-scale Employee Share Ownership Plans  (ESOPs)  have  been  a  distinctive  characteristic  of
Irish public enterprise reform, with shareholdings of 14.9 per cent being allocated to employees as part of  firm
restructuring and privatisation programmes.  This paper presents a case study analysis of a large-scale ESOP in
Eircom, Ireland’s former national telecommunications operator.  We  identify  changes  in  labour  productivity
during the eight years before and after the establishment of the company’s ESOP and  use  a  framework  based
on Pierce et al. (2001, 1991) to explore the role played by the ESOP. The ESOP was found to play  a  key  role
in enabling firm-level reform through concession bargaining and changes in  employee  relations,  and  thereby
indirectly affecting labour productivity.  However, despite the  substantial  shareholding  and  influence  of  the
ESOP, we find it has failed  to  create  a  sense  of  psychological  ownership  among  employees,  and  thereby
further impact on productivity.
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Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been considerable growth in the number  of  employee  share-
ownership (ESO) programmes established within the EU.  The increase in the  popularity  of  such
programmes has been largely driven  by the PEPPER reports and the introduction  of  government
tax  incentives  (Perotin  and  Robinson  2003,  Welz  and  Fernández   Macías   2007).    Financial
participation of employees in the form of share ownership and profit sharing has been  particularly
prominent  in  Ireland,  where  the  percentage  of  employees  participating   in   share   ownership
schemes ranks as the highest in the EU27 and among the highest for profit sharing schemes (Welz
and Fernández Macías 2007, Hashi and Woodward 2009).
The rationale underlying ESO  schemes  centres  on  promoting  greater  firm  performance
through  creating  a  sense  of  ownership  among  employees.   Existing   research   has   therefore
generally  focused  on  examining  the  impact  of  ESO  on  labour  and  labour  productivity.   US
research findings based on small privately-held firms has found a consistent  positive  relationship
between ESO and labour productivity (Blasi, Kruse, Sesil and Kroumova 2003b).  Predominantly,
these  ESO  schemes  were  established   to   promote   greater   employee   participation   in   firm
governance and often involved a transfer of ownership in excess  of  30  per  cent.   Such  schemes
create a sense of ownership among employees by providing significant stock contributions and  by
continually reinforcing employee ownership  status  through  managerial  recognition  and  greater
employee participation in firm decision-making (Rosen 2007).
The  extant  literature  has  however  failed  to  establish  a  similar  consistent  relationship
between ESO and the productivity of large  publicly-quoted  firms  (Rosen  2007).   Employees  in
publicly-quoted firms often receive only a limited shareholding, frequently less  than  10  per  cent
(Blasi et al. 2003b).  As a result, ESO  accounts  for  only  a  small  proportion  of  total  employee
remuneration.  Moreover, ESO in publicly-quoted firms is often used  to  pursue  objectives  other
than securing improved labour productivity through greater participation.  Instead,  ESO  schemes
are often introduced with the aim of restructuring employee wages or to facilitate the  privatisation
of state-owned enterprises (Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein 2003a,  Lowitzsch,  Hashi  and  Woodward
2008).  Such ESO schemes involve little change in firm governance or management, and therefore
fail to establish a greater sense of ownership among employees.
Since the 1980s, a common feature of public sector reform programmes  pursued  in  many
Western European countries has been the preferential allocation of  a  small  portion  of  shares  to
employees.  Shares are generally offered to employees for free or at a discounted price in order  to
ensure their consent to firm restructuring and avoid opposition to privatisation (Jones, Megginson,
Nash and Netter 1999).  In this regard, the experience in Ireland was no different during  the  early
years of its reform  programme.   However,  beginning  in  1998,  a  unique  development  in  Irish
public sector reform was the allocation of a sizeable firm shareholding to  employees  through  the
establishment  of  Employee  Share  Ownership  Plans  (ESOPs).   These  ESOPs  generally  grant
employees a 14.9 per cent shareholding in return for a restructuring and rationalisation  deal.   The
rationale   underpinning   their   establishment   has    been    both    pragmatic    and    ideological.
Pragmatically, ESOPs have been used ‘to neutralise union opposition to privatisation by means  of
the substitution of employee participation in companies at board level with financial participation’
(Sweeney 2004: 16).  Ideologically, the government also views ESOPs as  a  means  of  improving
labour productivity by aligning worker goals with those of the firm (Lowitzsch et al. 2008).
The establishment of such substantial ESOPs in Irish public sector  enterprises  provides  a
unique  opportunity  to  investigate  the  impact  such  a  stakeholder  approach  can  have  on   the
productivity  of  public  sector  enterprises  undergoing  reform.   The  paper  adopts  a  case  study
approach, focusing  on  Ireland’s  former  national  telecommunications  company,  Eircom.   This
paper seeks to contribute to the literature on both ESO and public-sector reform by examining  the
role employee financial participation can play in altering the  impact  of  public  sector  reform  on
employee attitudes and firm productivity.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section outlines a theoretical framework  based
on Pierce et al (2001, 1991) to  examine  how  ESO  schemes  are  expected  to  impact  on  labour
productivity. The following  section  provides  a  contextual  background  by  outlining  the  major
developments in Eircom’s internal and external environment over  the  period  of  analysis,  before
describing the  methodology  we  adopt.   The  analysis  section  of  the  paper  is  divided  in  two,
reflecting a need to first establish what changes in labour  productivity  have  occurred  within  the
period under examination, and the possible causes of such change, before moving  on  to  examine
the role of the ESOP in creating these changes.   The  paper  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  the
findings and recommendations for policymakers.
Theoretical framework
The  establishment  of  a  substantial  employee  share-ownership  scheme  as  part   of   a   reform
programme can be expected to have  a  significant  impact  on  labour  productivity.   Pierce  et  al.
(2001, 1991) propose that this can occur  through  both  the  formal  ownership  rights  that  share-
ownership  provides  employees  and  their  representatives  with,   and   through   psychologically
experienced ownership and the resulting impact on employee attitudes and behaviour.
Existing research shows that the introduction  of  a  formal  ESO  scheme  is  not  by  itself
enough to influence employee attitudes and behaviour (Poole and  Jenkins  1992).   This  has  also
been observed where ESO is introduced in the context of privatisation (see for example O’Connell
Davidson  1993,   Saunders   and   Harris   1994,   Smith   2009).    Instead,   improved   employee
performance  is  observed  only  where  ESO  is  associated  with  substantial  performance-related
returns  and  increased  employee  involvement  in  firm  decision-making   (Pendleton,   Poutsma,
Ommeren and Brewster 2001, Freeman, Kruse  and  Blasi  2004,  Gittell,  Von  Nordenflycht  and
Kochan 2004, Kruse et al. 2004).
As a result, ESO should be viewed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, consisting of both
a formal element  and  a  psychologically  experienced  element  (Pierce,  Rubenfeld  and  Morgan
1991).  ESO  grants  employees  numerous  formal  participation  rights,  including  voting  rights,
access to information, and board-level representation.  However, the psychologically  experienced
element of ESO,  centring  on  equity  possession,  influence  and  information,  can  often  have  a
greater impact on employee behaviour and attitudes (Pierce et al. 1991).  Each  of  these  elements
can enable employees to develop a sense of psychological ownership towards their organisation or
elements of their organisation, “…in which  individuals  feel  as  though  the  target  of  ownership
(material or immaterial in nature) or a piece of it is “theirs” (i.e. “it is  MINE!”)  (Pierce,  Kostova
and  Dirks  2001:  p.299).   Such  a  sense  of  ownership  can  be  expected  to  significantly   alter
employee attitudes and behaviour, and thereby labour productivity.
As  outlined  in  Figure  1,   Pierce   (1991)   identifies   a   number   of   preconditions   for
psychologically   experienced   ownership,   including   ownership   expectations,   perceptions   of
legitimacy, management philosophy, employee’s  financial  orientation,  and  types  of  ownership
and context of origin.
Figure 1: A model of employee ownership
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Source: Pierce et al. (1991, 2001)
ESO creates expectations among employees in terms of their influence over firm  decision-
making and  their  legal  rights.   Improved  employee  performance  is  facilitated  where  ESO  is
accompanied by information sharing with employees and effective employee participation in  firm
decision-making (Ben-Ner  and  Jones  1995,  Pendleton,  Wilson  and  Wright  1998).   However,
failure to meet such expectations can result  in  reduced  employee  sense  of  ownership  and  thus
create reduced work effort and motivation.  Similarly, were employees feel  their  ESO  scheme  is
legitimate, fulfilling what they see as fair in  terms  of  their  ownership  rights,  one  can  expect  a
favourable outcome in terms of employees’ sense of ownership.
A common aim of ESO is to help align  the  objectives  of  employees  with  those  of  firm
management and allow employees to observe their  individual  contribution  to  firm  performance
through shared information and financial returns (Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi and Kruse 2002, Blasi et
al.  2004).   However,  to  fulfil  this  objective,  it  is  important   for   managerial   philosophy   to
demonstrate  a  commitment  to  employee  participation.   Management   must   be   proactive   in
encouraging a sense of ownership among employees through the provision of information and  the
allocation of  decision-making  authority  (Gianaris  1996,  Blasi  et  al.  2003a,  Kaarsemaker  and
Poutsma  2006).   This  requires  management  to   identify   the   long-term   gains   of   employee
participation and improved firm industrial  relations.   However,  management  resistance  to  ESO
can often stem from an unwillingness  to  empower  employees  and  the  assertion  that  ESO  can
overcomplicate firm decision-making.
The prism through  which  employees  view  the  objectives  and  aims  of  ESO  (financial
orientation) is another significant factor in determining whether or not employees form a sense  of
ownership for element of the  organisation.   Where  employees  view  ESO  solely  as  a  financial
investment, as opposed to a return on individual performance, it can be expected that there will  be
a limited impact on employee sense of ownership (French 1987).  The ability  of  ESO  to  provide
employees with an effective financial incentive can be limited by their ability to identify an effort-
return link, when the value they create individually has to be shared  among  all  shareholders  and
factors other than their work effort influence share values (Conte  and  Kruse  1991,  Ben-Ner  and
Jones 1995, Blasi, Conte and Kruse 1996).
The way in which employees  view  ESO  will  largely  be  determined  by  the  context  in
which it is introduced.  Where it  is  introduced  as  part  of  concession  bargaining  or  to  provide
employees with a form of financial benefit, then the focus of employees and management  will  be
on the financial compensation they receive (Pierce et  al.  1991).   On  the  other  hand,  where  the
aims of the ESO scheme are  founded  on  a  desire  to  create  organisational  advantages  through
employee participation in decision-making, a set of employee expectations  based  on  information
sharing and a shared burden can be expected.
Pierce  (2001)  proposes  that  the  establishment  of  a  sense  of  psychological  ownership
among employees can result in a number of behavioural changes.  These can be categorised into 3
main  areas.   Firstly,  a  sense  of  ownership  gives  employees  a   set   of   expected   rights   and
responsibilities.  As employees develop a feeling of shared burden  in  the  organisation,  they  can
therefore develop a sense of responsibility for the success or failure  of  the  organisation.   On  the
other hand, employees can also be expected to develop a sense of entitlement to information and a
say in decision-making, and be  expected  to  become  frustrated  and  uncooperative  where  these
expectations  are  not  meet.   Secondly,  a  sense  of  ownership  can   affect   the   willingness   of
employees to accept and  participate  in  organisational  change.   Where  change  is  seen  as  self-
initiated, evolutionary and additive, employees can be  expected  to  support  it.   However,  where
change is imposed, revolutionary  and  subtractive,  it  can  be  expected  to  undermine  employee
performance.  Finally, a sense of  ownership  can  also  have  a  number  of  psychological  effects.
ESO is beneficial where it results in employees  monitoring  their  co-workers  and  applying  peer
pressure to perform (Blasi et al. 2004).  On the other hand,  it  can  also  lead  to  unwillingness  to
share ownership of a target with others.
The above discussion highlights a need to examine the operational elements  of  ESO  (e.g.
voting rights, participation structures, financial returns), and the subsequent  impact  on  employee
attitudes.  Furthermore, it  highlights  the  importance  of  examining  the  context  in  which  ESO
develops and the expectation which employees acquire when entering  such  schemes.   Therefore,
before outlining our methodology and analysis, we will  first  outline  the  context  in  which  ESO
developed in Eircom, focusing on its objectives and role in firm governance and strategy.
The reform of Eircom and its ESOP
In  evaluating  the  impact  of  ESO  on  labour  productivity,  it  is  important  to  remember   ‘that
employee participation cannot and will not be divorced from other human  resource  practices  and
organisational strategies.  The implication of this argument is that we need to look at the  total  set
of organisational strategies and assess their effects on performance’ (Kochan and Osterman  1994,
p. 64).  In the case of Eircom it is important to note that  the  establishment  of  the  Eircom  ESOP
formed an integral part of the firm’s restructuring and privatisation process and followed  years  of
commercialisation.  It is therefore important that we take into account the impact privatisation and
commercialisation have had on firm strategy when evaluating changes in labour productivity.
In 1984, the control and operation of  Ireland’s  national  telecommunications  service  was
transferred from the civil service to a  newly  established  commercial  publicly-owned  enterprise,
Bord Telecom Éireann.  Following  its  incorporation,  the  firm  went  through  a  period  of  rapid
commercialisation  during  the  later  half  of  the  1980s.   However,  during  the  1990s  the   firm
continued to face challenges arising from a rapidly changing external  environment,  characterised
by increased competition, technological advances and wider  consumer  choice.   As  a  result,  the
firm sought to become  a  customer-driven  competitor  and  to  further  integrate  with  the  global
telecommunications market.  Various initiatives were introduced to improve firm governance  and
customer service, and in 1996 the firm was part-privatised when a 20  per  cent  shareholding  was
sold as part of a strategic alliance with the Comsource consortium[1].  This helped to  prepare  the
company for full market liberalisation, which occurred in 1998, and provided investment funds  to
reduce the firm’s considerable  debts.   It  also  altered  the  firm’s  managerial  and  organisational
structure,  which  was  restructured  around  five  market-based  business  units  (Telecom-Éireann
1997a).
At this time, the firm undertook to significantly reduce employee costs and improve labour
productivity through the negotiation of  a  radical  restructuring  plan,  The  Telecom  Partnership.
Under this agreement the firm established an internal labour market and a new management-union
partnership structure.  The agreement also entailed a number of changes to work practices and  the
introduction of  cost-cutting  measures  aimed  at  saving  €140  million  per  annum  for  five  years
(Telecom-Éireann 1997b).  In exchange for accepting  the  concessions  outlined  in  The  Telecom
Partnership, employees received a 14.9 per  cent  shareholding  through  the  establishment  of  an
ESOP in 1998.
The initial aims of the Eircom ESOP were to support the transformation of the firm in to  a
world-class telecommunications firm, provide employees  with  a  strong  collective  influence  on
shareholder decisions, and  to  provide  employees  with  financial  compensation  for  concessions
given.[2]  The structure of the ESOP centres on a limited liability trust whose board of directors is
dominated  by  trade  union  nominees.   The  trust  received  an   initial   five   per   cent   ordinary
shareholding in exchange for accepting the terms of The  Telecom  Partnership,  and  purchased  a
further 9.9 per cent at a discounted price (€241 million).[3]
In 1999 the Irish government took the decision to sell its entire remaining  shareholding  in
Telecom Éireann by way of an initial public offer (IPO).  The company was floated  on  the  stock
market in  July  1999  under  the  new  name  Eircom.   Less  than  a  year  after  the  IPO,  Eircom
experienced a significant decline in its share price due to a  number  of  factors  including  a  sharp
downturn in the global telecommunications market.  Under pressure from shareholders, the  firm’s
mobile phone subsidiary, Eircell, was demerged and sold to Vodafone in May 2001 by means of a
share-swap.   Following  the  sale  of  Eircell,  two  rival  consortia  of  investors,  Valentia[4]  and
eIsland[5], bid for Eircom’s remaining fixed-line business.  After an intense bidding  war,  Eircom
was purchased by  Valentia  as  part  of  a  highly  leveraged  buyout.   The  support  of  the  ESOP
ensured the Valentia consortium succeeded, even though the eIsland cash offer  was  higher.   The
ESOP trust felt that the Valentia deal, under which it secured a further  15  per  cent  shareholding,
provided greater benefits and certainty to its participants.
Following the takeover, the Valentia consortium pursued a  policy  of  extracting  as  much
profit as possible from Eircom in as short a time as possible.  This  was  facilitated  by  significant
labour shedding (see table 1) and reductions in capital investment, as well as  the  restructuring  of
firm debt.  The restructuring  of  Eircom’s  debt  in  2003,  which  involved  refinancing  Eircom’s
entire debt of just over €2 billion,  was  immediately  followed  by  the  payment  of  a  €446  million
special dividend at a time when the company was loss-making.[6]  The  ESOP  Trustee  supported
the decision to refinance Eircom’s debt and received a total of  €230  million,  accounting  for  over
half its original investment  in  Valentia  and  allowing  it  to  make  a  distribution  to  participants
(Eircom ESOP Trustee, 2003).  The  Valentia  consortium  and  ESOP  Trustee  generated  further
returns on their investment when the decision was made to re-float Eircom on the stock market  in
2004.
Since its re-flotation on the stock  market  in  2004,  Eircom  has  experienced  two  further
changes in ownership.   In  September  2006,  the  firm  was  once  more  delisted  from  the  stock
exchange after it was taken over by the Australian investment firm Babcock &  Brown  in  another
highly leveraged buyout.   This  takeover  again  substantially  increased  firm  debt  and  failed  to
create increased investment in Eircom’s infrastructure (Palcic and Reeves  2011).   Similar  to  the
Valentia takeover, the success of  the  Babcock  &  Brown  takeover  required  the  support  of  the
ESOP, whose position was used to increase its shareholding to its current level of 35 per  cent.   In
January 2010, Eircom was purchased by Singapore Technologies Telemedia (STT) for a mere €140
million, due to Eircom’s massive debt burden of close to €4 billion.  The considerable  influence  of
the ESOP was again evident in  STT’s  successful  bid,  as  the  support  of  the  ESOP  effectively
eliminated all other interested parties from the bidding contest.
It is evident from the events described above that  Eircom  has  gone  through  a  period  of
enormous change in the past two decades, with the ESOP playing a significant role in the  changes
that have taken place since privatisation. Recognising the central role played by the  ESOP  in  the
strategic direction of Eircom, we move on to examine the impact  the  ESOP  has  had  on  driving
labour productivity growth. The following section outlines our methodology before moving on  to
present the results of our analysis.
Methodology
Our analysis is based on data sourced from Eircom annual reports, reports from the Eircom  ESOP
Trustee ltd. and from a survey of  Eircom  employees.   The  employee  survey  was  conducted  in
February 2007, nine years after the establishment of the  ESOP,  when  the  company’s  workforce
stood at just over seven thousand.  The survey received the support of Eircom’s  management  and
trade union coalition.   Using a representative sampling frame supplied by  firm  management,  the
survey was distributed among a thousand employees using an online  survey  provider.   The  final
number of usable responses was 711, creating a response rate of just over 70 per cent.
Measures used
Changes in labour productivity: Using firm accounts data, labour productivity is calculated for the
eight years before and after the establishment of the ESOP using a labour  productivity  index  that
relates changes in the quantity of output to changes in the quantity of labour input.  The estimation
of labour productivity requires a suitable measure of output which can be difficult to  measure  for
the telecommunications industry.  In this analysis output was measured using  an  index  based  on
deflated revenues, as studies such as Martin and Parker (1997)  and  Foreman-Peck  and  Manning
(1988) have shown it to be a  better  proxy  for  output  in  the  telecommunications  industry  than
indicators based on physical quantities such as number of  telephone  lines.[7]   Labour  input  was
measured as physical man hours per annum.[8]
Changes in the level of  employee  participation  in  firm  decision-making:  As  one  of  the  main
elements in creating a sense of ownership among employees,  it  was  important  to  measure  how
employees perceived changes in their level of influence in decision-making  since  the  ESOP  was
established.  In the survey, employees indicated changes in their level of participation in decisions
affecting nine items since the introduction of  the  ESOP  using  a  seven-point  scale  from  ‘much
more say’ to ‘much less say’.  Four items related to participation at the operational  level  and  five
items related to departmental /strategic-level issues.
Employee  financial  returns  from  the  ESOP:  the  level  of  financial  return  and  its  relation  to
employee performance  is  also  an  important  element  in  determining  the  impact  on  employee
attitudes and behaviour.  However,  it  was  not  possible  to  measure  the  return  each  individual
employee earned from  the  Eircom  ESOP.   However,  using  data  sourced  from  Eircom  ESOP
Trustee ltd, it was possible to measure the value of benefits accumulated by those employees  who
are full participants of the ESOP.  A full participant refers to an employee who had given one year
of continuous service to the firm prior to the establishment of the ESOP  in  1998,  and  is  thereby
entitled to a full allocation of benefits under any given distribution.  As this includes  over  90  per
cent of survey respondents, this paper uses the benefits accumulated by full participants as a proxy
for returns earned by employees.
The analysis that follows is divided into two sections.  The first section  identifies  changes
in labour productivity growth during the eight years  before  and  after  the  establishement  of  the
Eircom ESOP in 1998.  This section also briefly discusses the potential causes  for  these  changes
in labour productivity growth.  The second section focuses on  the  role  of  the  ESOP  in  altering
labour productivity growth during the period under examination.  More  specifically,  the  analysis
focuses on the development of employee psychological ownership through the receipt of  financial
returns and participation in firm decision-making.
Changes in labour productivity
The results from the labour productivity analysis (table 1) show that significant increases in labour
productivity occurred in the eight-year period preceding the  establishment  of  the  Eircom  ESOP
(105.7 per cent increase).  The substantial growth in real turnover during this period,  in  particular
in the run up to privatisation, would indicate  that  this  can  be  attributed  to  significant  business
growth and the commercialisation measures introduced.
Table 1: Eircom labour productivity (LP) pre- and post-ESOP
|Pre-ES|Employees|Real    |LP     | |Post-ESO|Employees|Real    |LP     |
|OP    |         |Turnover|       | |P       |         |Turnover|       |
|1990  |14,243   |870,259 |1.000  | |1998    |11,497   |1,549,30|1.000  |
|      |         |        |       | |        |         |5       |       |
|1991  |14,044   |966,674 |1.130  | |1999    |11,323   |1,746,75|1.148  |
|      |         |        |       | |        |         |2       |       |
|1992  |13,676   |997,158 |1.206  | |2000    |11,689   |1,879,78|1.177  |
|      |         |        |       | |        |         |0       |       |
|1993  |13,313   |997,605 |1.254  | |2001    |11,593   |2,192,58|1.340  |
|      |         |        |       | |        |         |3       |       |
|1994  |13,069   |1,014,52|1.296  | |2002    |10,338   |2,099,26|1.505  |
|      |         |5       |       | |        |         |2       |       |
|1995  |12,662   |1,106,34|1.431  | |2003    |9,129    |2,058,66|1.742  |
|      |         |1       |       | |        |         |4       |       |
|1996  |12,372   |1,305,54|1.675  | |2004    |8,306    |1,895,01|1.836  |
|      |         |1       |       | |        |         |6       |       |
|1997  |12,236   |1,472,00|1.837  | |2005    |7,595    |1,862,37|2.098  |
|      |         |9       |       | |        |         |5       |       |
|1998  |12,075   |1,720,04|2.057  | |2006    |7,249    |1,906,71|2.321  |
|      |         |3       |       | |        |         |4       |       |
|90-98 |-15.22%  |+97.6%  |+105.7%| |98-06   |-36.95%  |+23.1%  |+132.1%|
Notes: (1) Post-ESOP the analysis only uses employee and revenue figures for the fixed-line business since the mobile division, Eircell, was sold in
2001.  (2) Pre-ESOP the analysis is based on average employee and revenue figures for Eircom as a whole, however, given that the mobile division
was a relatively minor activity during this period (by March 1998, Eircell employees accounted for just  2.7  per  cent  of  total  employment,  while
Eircell’s revenue accounted for less than 1  per  cent  of  total  turnover),  the  pre-ESOP  and  post-ESOP  labour  productivity  figures  are  directly
comparable. (3) Turnover was deflated using the Irish Communications Price Index sourced from the Central Statistics Office (March 1998=1).
In the eight years after the establishment of the ESOP, labour productivity again  increased
significantly  (by  132.1  per  cent).   However,  much  of  this  increase  is  arguably   due   to   the
significant labour shedding  that occurred following the Valentia takeover in 2001, with  relatively
little growth in  output  recorded  over  the  period  (see  columns  labelled  ‘employees’  and  ‘real
turnover’ in table 1).
It must be noted that the pre- and post-ESOP results presented above span a  period  where
Eircom was  going  through  enormous  changes  in  both  its  internal  and  external  environment.
Externally, the company was operating in an increasingly competitive environment in  the  run  up
to, and following the full liberalisation of the telecommunications  market  in  1998.   Eircom  also
became subject to price cap regulation in 1997.  Internally, the commercialisation of the  company
from 1990 onwards and the various changes in ownership that occurred after 1999  all  resulted  in
considerable internal organisational restructuring.  Given  the  scale  of  the  changes  occurring  in
Eircom’s product market and within the company itself, it  is  highly  problematic  to  identify  the
exact drivers of productivity change over the period examined.  Moreover,  labour  productivity  is
only a partial productivity measure that must be interpreted with caution since  changes  in  output
can be influenced by many other factors.
Many  empirical   studies   on   the   drivers   of   productivity   change   in   the   European
telecommunications industry have struggled with separating the impact of factors such as  changes
in competition, ownership and technology on company performance (see, for example,  Bortolotti,
D’Souza, Fantini and Megginson 2002, Daßler, Parker and  Saal  2002).   In  the  case  of  Eircom,
Palcic and Reeves (2010) adopted a model of organisational change to disentangle  the  impact  of
privatisation from other factors that influenced the company’s labour and total factor  productivity
from 1985-2001.  They found no clear evidence that ownership change  had  a  significant  impact
on productivity.  Rather, improvements in productivity were found to be associated with increased
competitive pressures  and  the  impending  deregulation  of  the  market  as  well  as  considerable
changes in the internal organisational structure of the firm.
While recognising these limitations, the results presented in  table  1  nevertheless  show  a
substantial increase in labour productivity since the introduction of the Eircom ESOP.  It could  be
argued that the improvement in productivity reflects the continuation of a  trend  established  prior
to the ESOP.  Furthermore, it could also have resulted from the substantial reductions in employee
numbers and changes in work practices that have  followed  the  implementation  of  The  Telecom
Partnership and the various changes in firm ownership.  Although the ESOP played a key  role  in
enabling many of these reforms, it is not possible to  discern  the  proportion  of  increased  labour
productivity that is  directly  a  result  of  decisions  taken  by  the  ESOP.   Furthermore,  it  is  not
possible to discern what proportion can be attributed to the ability of ESO to  align  the  objectives
of employees and other shareholders.  Therefore, in order to address this later point and gain some
insight into the role of the ESOP, it is necessary  to  examine  the  impact  the  ESOP  has  had  on
individual employees in terms of both their financial participation and influence  in  firm  decision
making.
Role of the ESOP in creating a sense of psychological ownership
The level  of  impact  ESO  will  have  on  employee  attitudes  and  behaviour,  and  by  extension
productivity,  is  largely  determined  by  the  degree  to  which  employees  establish  a   sense   of
ownership through equity possession, influence  in  decision-making,  and  access  to  information
(Pierce  et  al.  2001).   As  described  earlier,  the  Eircom  ESOP  currently  holds  a  35  per  cent
shareholding in the firm and has significant influence over  firm  strategic  decision-making.   This
section will now discuss the influence the ESOP has had on individual employees and  the  degree
to which it has established a  sense  of  ownership  among  employees.   The  discussion  will  first
examine the level of employee financial participation and its ability to provide effective employee
incentivisation.   Secondly,  the  level  of  perceived   participation   in   decision   making   among
employees will be discussed.
To date, the Eircom ESOP has made thirteen separate distributions of financial benefits  to
its participants (table 2).  Those employees who are full participants have received shares and cash
benefits to the nominal value  of  approximately  €80,179.     Following  the  demerger  and  sale  of
Eircom’s mobile operations to Vodafone in 2001, the  ESOP  held  a  large  number  of  Vodafone
shares.  These Vodafone shares have  been  used  to  make  three  separate  distributions  to  ESOP
participants.  Apart from a brief period between 2004 and 2006, Eircom shares have been  delisted
from the stock exchange and ESOP participants have been unable to realise  the  value  of  Eircom
ordinary shares.  For this reason, instead of distributing ordinary shares to  participants  the  ESOP
has used the proceeds  from  redeemable  preference  shares  to  make  eight  cash  distributions  to
participants.
Table 2 ESOP distributions made to date
|Date        |Type of shares            |No. of       |Cash value (€)  |
|            |                          |shares*      |                |
|May 2002    |Vodafone ordinary shares  |7,270        |11,904          |
|Dec 2003    |Redeemable preference     |6,872        |6,872           |
|            |shares                    |             |                |
|April 2004  |Redeemable preference     |6,872        |6,872           |
|            |shares                    |             |                |
|Dec 2004    |Eircom ordinary shares    |3,307        |5,556†          |
|Mar 2005    |Eircom ordinary shares    |3,307        |6,614†          |
|Dec 2005    |Vodafone ordinary shares  |2,688        |4,781           |
|Nov 2006    |Redeemable preference     |13,701       |8,073           |
|            |shares                    |             |                |
|June 2007   |Redeemable preference     |13,714       |8,080           |
|            |shares                    |             |                |
|Nov 2007    |Redeemable preference     |4,619        |4,619           |
|            |shares                    |             |                |
|June 2008   |Redeemable preference     |13,748       |7,022           |
|            |shares                    |             |                |
|Nov 2008    |Redeemable preference     |5,065        |5,065           |
|            |shares                    |             |                |
|June 2009   |Redeemable preference     |3,916        |2,000           |
|            |shares                    |             |                |
|Nov 2010    |Vodafone ordinary shares  |1,375        |2,721           |
|Total                                  |-            |80,179          |
Source: www.esop.eircom.ie
*figures represent distributions per employee with a full notional allocation
† Value based on share price on day of distribution
Although the  ESOP  has  created  substantial  financial  returns  for  its  participants,  it  is
questionable whether this has established a clear line of sight between employee  productivity  and
the financial returns they receive.  There are a number of reasons  for  this.   Firstly,  much  of  the
variation in value of the ESOP’s portfolio has been created by extenuating factors such as the  sale
of Eircom’s  mobile  subsidiary  and  the  numerous  changes  in  firm  ownership,  and  cannot  be
directly attributed to changes  in  employee  productivity.   Secondly,  there  have  been  only  two
distributions (December 2004 and March 2005) in which participants have had  an  opportunity  to
take a direct ownership stake in Eircom  through  receiving  ordinary  shares.   Thirdly,  under  the
terms of the ESOP agreement, employees who leave Eircom can continue  to  remain  participants
in the ESOP, thereby giving rise to a free-rider problem.   Due  to  the  considerable  reductions  in
employment that have occurred since the ESOP was established, at present approximately  50  per
cent of ESOP participants are no longer employees of the firm.
Table 3: Changes in employee participation (percentages)
|                              |More say  |Neither |Less say|Chi-square |
|                              |(1-3)     |(4)     |        |?²         |
|                              |          |        |(5-7)   |           |
|Operational level             |          |        |        |           |
|Manner in which they do their |20        |34      |46      |236.75***  |
|work                          |15        |35      |50      |262.70***  |
|Hours they work               |18        |23      |59      |136.26***  |
|Pay/benefits they receive     |12        |30      |58      |241.39***  |
|Level of training they receive|16        |31      |53      |           |
|                              |          |        |        |           |
|Mean percentage 4 items       |          |        |        |           |
|Departmental/strategic level  |          |        |        |           |
|Hiring/dismissal of personnel |8         |27      |65      |265.20***  |
|Promotions/transfers of       |8         |26      |66      |252.66***  |
|personnel                     |19        |23      |58      |143.43***  |
|Firm                          |18        |18      |64      |152.28***  |
|closures/mergers/takeovers    |18        |22      |60      |139.85***  |
|Position/salary of senior Mgt |14        |23      |63      |           |
|Firm budget/finances          |          |        |        |           |
|Mean percentage 5 items       |          |        |        |           |
Notes: employees presented with scale 1 (much more say) to 7 (much less say)
* Item scores have been reversed
***Significant at 0.001
Given the important role played by the ESOP in  determining  changes  in  firm  ownership
post-privatisation, one would expect a strong sense  of  participation  in  firm  decision-making  to
have emerged among employees.  Furthermore, the ESOP trust  is  also  entitled  to  appoint  three
representatives to the firm’s board of directors.  However, results from the employee survey  show
that employees feel that the ESOP has not been associated with improved participation in decision-
making (table 3).  In fact, the majority of employees feel their level of participation has  decreased
since   the   introduction   of   the   ESOP,   at   both   the   operational-level   (53   per   cent)   and
departmental/strategic-level (63 per cent).
There are a number of  reasons  why  the  ESOP  has  failed  to  create  a  greater  sense  of
participation among employees.  Firstly, as neither the members of the ESOP’s board of  directors
nor  the  ESOP’s  representatives  on  Eircom’s  board  of   directors   are   appointed   directly   by
employees, but are appointed by senior trade union officials, employees may feel  they  have  little
influence over the decisions the ESOP makes.  Secondly, given that approximately 50 per  cent  of
ESOP participants are no longer employed by Eircom, it can be expected that  the  focus  of  these
participants will be on maximising short-term financial returns, as opposed to  securing  the  long-
term participation of employees in firm decision-making.  Finally, the original aim of  the  Eircom
ESOP  was  to  facilitate  restructuring  and  privatisation.   As  a  result,  many  employees,   trade
unionists and managers may view the ESOP primarily as a financial benefit scheme and  not  as  a
means of promoting a culture of direct employee cooperation in decision-making within the firm.
Discussion
This paper set out to examine the important role ESO can play in determining labour productivity.
 In Ireland, the establishment of substantial ESOPs as part of  the  country’s  public  sector  reform
programme has had a significant impact on the welfare of workers.  These  ESOPs  have  provided
employees with sizeable monetary returns along with considerable corporate power and influence.
 Using the case of the Eircom ESOP, this paper examines the role these  schemes  have  played  in
determining changes in labour productivity.
In relation to its financial objectives, findings show that the  Eircom  ESOP  has  met  with
considerable success.  To date, it has made substantial  distributions  totalling  approximately  €800
million to its members, and has increased its shareholding from 14.9  to  35  per  cent  since  1998.
Furthermore, the ESOP played a major role in determining the outcome of various changes in firm
ownership,  thereby   significantly   shaping   firm   strategy.    However   the   ESOP’s   focus   on
maintaining and improving the value of its portfolio during these takeovers has  arguably  been  at
the expense of the firm’s long-term  future.   The  post-privatisation  period  has  been  marked  by
significant reductions in capital expenditure,  which  has  severely  hindered  the  rollout  of  high-
speed broadband services in Ireland.  As a result, Ireland is perennially ranked close to the  bottom
of every EU and OECD broadband scorecard, and the Irish government has had to  directly  invest
in  broadband  infrastructure  itself  (see  Palcic  and  Reeves,   2011).    This,   coupled   with   the
significant level of debt currently owed by the firm, raises important questions  about  the  role  of
the ESOP in the governance  of  the  firm.   In  relation  to  the  objectives  pursued  by  such  ESO
schemes, it is important to remember that
“…labour generally sees its goal as getting as big a share as it can  for  its  workers,  regardless  of  the
long-term costs that may be imposed on their companies.  After  all,  they  reason,  management  has  a
short-term perspective as well, and there are no guarantees that labour savings will be used to  enhance
competitiveness.   Indeed,  they  might  just  be   used   to   add   to   shareholder   dividends,   increase
management bonuses, or acquire other companies”.
(Rosen, Klein and Young 1985: p.5)
From a policy perspective, the original  objective  in  establishing  the  Eircom  ESOP  was
both to “to  incentivise  and  motivate  employees  through  giving  them  a  shareholding  in  their
company leading to improved productivity”[9], and to transfer wealth  to  employees  and  thereby
reduce opposition to privatisation and firm restructuring.  Of these  two  objectives  the  latter  has
taken priority.  The findings in this paper show that  the  structure  of  ESO  schemes  such  as  the
Eircom  ESOP  face  limitations  in  promoting  a  culture  of  direct  employee  participation   and
enhanced employee behaviour.  We find that although labour productivity  growth  was  higher  in
the post-ESOP period, this cannot be attributed the creation of a sense of psychological ownership
among  employees.   Indeed,  many  employees  reported  a  marked  decrease  in   their   level   of
participation in the firm decision-making, perhaps reflecting  disappointed  expectations.   Instead,
the  improvement  in  labour  productivity  has  been  created  by  large  reductions   in   staff   and
substantial changes to firm work practices.
The primary function of ESOPs established as part of the privatisation  process  in  Ireland
appears to be the transfer, over a defined period of time and in  a  tax  efficient  manner,  a  certain
proportion of firm wealth to employees.  If the objective of policy makers is to transfer wealth and
a direct ownership stake in the firm to employees, it is necessary  to  question  if  there  is  a  more
appropriate mechanism for achieving  this  (for  example,  offering  individual  employees  free  or
discounted shares).  As can be seen in the case of Eircom, a large transfer of ownership in a  listed
firm to an ESOP trust can allow that trust to become a key  strategic  decision-maker,  particularly
in relation to changes in firm ownership.  Furthermore, instead of using  this  position  to  promote
the long-term future of  the  firm  and  its  workforce,  the  trust  can  act  as  a  wealth-maximising
investor with a  focus  on  increasing  the  financial  gains  for  its  participants  beyond  what  was
originally envisaged by policy makers.  These are issues that require  serious  consideration  when
establishing future ESO schemes as part of the restructuring  and  privatising  of  remaining  state-
owned enterprises.
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[1] The Comsource consortium consisted of the then national telecommunications operator  of  the
Netherlands,  PTT  Telecom  (later  KPN  NV),  and  the  Swedish   national   telecommunications
operator, Telia AB.
[2] Taken from ESOP in Brief , Available: www.esop.eircom.ie/pdf/booklets/esopinbrief.pdf
[3] The ESOP acquired the 9.9 per cent  shareholding  through  a  €127  million  contribution  from
Eircom and a €114 million loan, which was secured on the ESOP’s shareholding  and  repaid  using
revenue from a profit-sharing scheme and dividends.
[4] A consortium of private equity investors including Providence Equity  Partners,  Soros  Private
Equity Partners, Goldman Sachs and headed by Irish businessman Anthony O’Reilly.
[5]A consortium headed by Irish businessman Denis O’Brien.
[6] Eircom incurred a net loss of €531 million for the  financial  year  ending  in  March  2004  as  a
result of the special dividend paid out (Eircom Annual Report 2004).
[7] Output measures based on  deflated  revenues  are  a  better  proxy  for  output  since  revenues
reflect other aspects of output such as volume of call traffic, the type of call  made  and  any  other
value-added services that physical measures of output such as number  of  telephone  lines  do  not
take account of.
[8] The average number of full-time employees per year was obtained  from  annual  reports.   The
figures for hours worked per week were taken from the Central Statistics Office (CSO).  Data was
not available for the telecommunications industry itself so figures for industrial hours worked was
used as a proxy.
[9]  Minister  for  Public  Enterprise,   Mary   O’Rourke,   Dáil   Éireann   debate   on   “Employee
Shareholding Schemes”, 12 May, 1999.
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